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OVERVIEW
The crux of General Motors1 argument is that a stone
could not become lodged in the pinch point between the flexible
coupling and the end retainer nut, causing a total loss of
steering.

In reviewing this Reply Brief, the appellants ask this

Court to weigh heavily the uncontested fact that the driver, Wayne
Nay, could not turn the vehicle to the left.
The investigations conducted by each of the appellants1
expert witnesses indicated that the wheels of the vehicle were
pointed straight ahead as the vehicle went over the cliff.
Vol. I, p. 135, 1. 5-17; p. 16, 1. 1-18).

(T.

These witnesses'

testimony was corroborated by the investigating officer's report.
(T. Exhibits 21-22).
Furthermore, the only surviving eye witness to the
accident, Matthew Nay, testified that he saw his granduncle trying
in vain to turn the steering wheel, but that the steering wheel
would not turn left.
15).

(T. Vol. I, p. 61, 1. 11-13; p. 66, 1. 10-

Moreover, the driver's dying words were that the "goddamn

truck didn't turn" (T. Vol. I, p. 84, 1. 11-13).
The fact that Wayne Nay could not turn the vehicle is the
most crucial fact surrounding this litigation. General Motors has
not specifically addressed this fact, but rather has alleged that
the fact is irrelevant. (Brief of Appellee, p. 6) .

But the

appellants urge upon this Court a different interpretation of the

facts of this case.
left.

Wayne Nay could not turn the steering wheel

There is no dispute on that point. The question is why he

could not turn the steering wheel. The appellants ask the Court to
keep this fact and issue foremost in their mind when reviewing the
facts of this case.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
General Motors asserts in its Statement of Facts that
each of the appellants1 expert witnesses searched for witness marks
but

could

find

none.

(Brief

of

the Appellee, p.

mischaracterizes the testimony of these witnesses.

7) .

This

David Stephens

was the first witness to handle the steering coupling components
from the vehicle involved in the accident.

When asked at trial

whether he could find witness marks, he responded that he noticed
none but that he was not looking for such marks during his initial
examination because he was unsure of the cause of the accident at
that time.

(T. Vol. II, p. 53, 1. 2-9).

Lindley Manning also did not look for witness marks when
he first examined the steering coupling components because he
didn't know the cause of the crash.

(T. Vol. II., p. 15, 1. 9-16).

Mr. Manning also viewed the photographs taken by Mr. Stephens, but
could not discern witness marks because the photographs were taken
at the wrong angle. (T.Vol. II., p. 15, 1. 17-25).

2

Dr. Ben Basye also did not look for witness marks when he
viewed the photographs taken by David Stephens because he was
unsure

of

the

cause

of

the accident

when

he

photographs. (T. Vol. II., p. 87. 1. 12-19).

first

saw

the

Furthermore, Mr.

Stephens testified that the angle at which the photographs were
taken would not show witness marks.
General Motors1

(T. Vol. II, p.

assertion that the appellants1

64-66).

witnesses were

unable to find witness marks is wrong. These witnesses did not look
for witness marks because the cause of the accident was unclear at
the time the photographs were taken. Mr. Stephens has testified as
follows about the witness marks:
3. I was the first person to disassemble the
steering gear from the Nay truck.
At that
time, I was not aware of the possibility of a
rock or other foreign object getting in the
area of the steering coupling and frame or
gearbox end nut and cause steering limiting
interference.
I therefore did not look for
marks which might have been left by such
interference. By the time that I had become
aware of the interference possibility, the
steering coupling and end nut had been
disposed of and were no longer available for
examination.
(See Affidavit of David Stephens, Ex. N. and T. Vol. II p. 52-53).
General Motors1 allegations that there were no rocks or
stones ont he road large enough to have jammed the steering, that
"when

plaintiffs1

experts

manually

inserted

a

rock

in

their

candidate location, and allowed members of the jury to attempt to
3

turn the steering wheel, the rock always broke or popped loose and,
that "the average man can easily exert 200 foot-pounds of torque on
the steering wheel, which translates to 3000 pounds of force on the
rock" are not supported by the record and are all without merit.
The rocks used in the test before the jury were from the
scene of the accident. Mr. Manning testified as follows:
A.

That's two of the rocks that we picked up at the
scene with Mr. Stephens when I was there.

Q.

And for the record, those are the same rocks that
you used in this demonstration with the jury?

A.

I used one with the jury and the other one was the
one we worked with last night. (T. Vol. 1 p. 27:
22-25; 28: 1-2)

Of the eight jurors who felt the resistance of the
steering wheel when the rock was inserted between the flexible
coupling and the end retainer nut, only one or two jurors, both
women, who turned the steering wheel hard to the left, were able to
dislodge or break the rock.
Mr. Hansen: Your Honor, I'm wondering if we
might ask that the jury have an opportunity to
feel how much resistance is ont he steering
wheel?
The Court: Any objection?
Mr. Clegg:

I have none.

The Court:
You may, you can step down
individually, come down and attempt to turn
the wheel.

4

Mr. Hansen:
Is it possible that somebody
could turn real hard and overcome that.
(This last statement was made after five or six of the eight jurors
had attempted to turn the steering wheel without success.)
The Witness: I would think that if you pushed
hard enough, I don't know what strength it
would take for the strength of that particular
rock.
But it's pretty solidly wedged in
there.
Q.

(By Mr. Hansen) What if you turn the wheel back
this other direction?

A.

It would fall right out.

Q.

(By Mr. Hansen) You can use both hands.

A.

You did break a piece off the rock, too. This one
may not be the right shape any more.

Mr. Clegg:
The record show the women are
doing much better then the men?
(T. Vol 1. p. 25: 19-25; 26: 1-17)
It should be kept in mind that if a driver is proceeding
down a narrow mountain road at about 40-50 miles on an hour with a
severe drop-off to the right that if he all of a sudden had a
problem in turning the steering wheel to the left, that the
reasonably prudent driver would continue exerting force to the left
but would not turn hard to left for fear of over correcting and
over turning once the steering wheel broke free and he would not
turn the steering wheel to the right because of the severe dropoff.

Being on the road in a real life situation where there is

danger of losing your life is different than being in the courtroom
5

where there is no such danger.

A steering wheel is a sensitive

instrument which requires only a slight turn in order to direct the
wheels. Thus, a driver does not generally turn the steering wheel
hard to the left or the right when the steering is jammed in a real
life situation. The driver is faced with an emergency situation and
is only expected to do what a reasonably prudent person would have
done under those circumstances.

It is a jury question.

General Motors' allegation that "the average man can
easily exert 200 foot-pounds of torque on the steering wheel" also
is without merit. Dr. Basye has testified as follows:
To exert 200 foot-pounds of torque on a
steering wheel, 14 inches in diameter, which
is similar to the Nay vehicle, one would have
to push up with 171 pounds with one hand and
down with 171 pounds with the other hand in
the opposite direction.
(171 pounds) times (14/12 feet) = 200 foot-pounds
It is false to state that the average male can
do this!
(Affidavit of Ben Basye, Exhibit 0)
Just because General Motors says it, doesn't make it true.
Mr. Manning further testified as to other items that
could have been responsible for jamming the steering ont he Nay
vehicle.
Q.

We have just been talking about rocks. Are there
other items other than rocks that could catch int
he flexible coupling?
6

A.

Well, anything of a somewhat similar size would do
it. Of course, there's a lot of coal around the
edge of that road from being handled there. There
would be a piece of wood, a bolt head, or any piece
that fell off a car, or who knows what else. Any
kind of a foreign object that is fairly hard and of
approximately the right size or have part of it the
right size could get in there.

Q.

Do you think you would be able to, if you will, put
a rock in and show the steering interference to the
jury?

A.

Yes.

(T. Vol. 1. p. 24: 22-25; 25: 1-10)
Mr. Manning further testified as to what could be done to
correct the defect in the General Motors' trucks similar to the Nay
vehicle.
Q.

Mr. Manning, based on your engineering experience,
could the mechanical defect you say existed in the
Nay vehicle, have been corrected?

A.

Yes.

Q.

How could that problem have been corrected?

A.

Well, to me, the best way to correct it is to
eliminate the pinch point making the lower hub on
the steering—could have made the flexible coupling
longer so that the coupling was farther from the
steering box, would have been one way of doing it.

It could have.

* * *

A

. . . Another way might have been to reverse the
ears on that end retainer nut so the didn't stick
up and form a pinch point with the flexible
coupling.
* * *

7

A

And then the other thing would be some kind of
guard to keep foreign material out or of any sort
out of there.
* * *

Q

. . . Can you give us some kind of idea as to how
much
expense would
be
involved
in these
corrections?

A

. . . About the only thing I can do is reiterate
what has been told to me and in one of the
depositions in this case, that plastic guard in a
similar situation—another vehicle entirely, was
something less than a dollar in cost.

(T. Vol. 1 p. 28: 3-12, 19-21; 29: 14-16; 30: 12-14, 15-19)
Dr. Ben Basye and David Stephens have testified as
follows concerning what General Motors has done with regard to the
pinch point between the flexible coupling and the end retainer nut
since the September 20, 1986 accident involving the 1986 GM truck
which Wayne Nay purchased new on July 3, 1986:
4.
It is my opinion that the Nay vehicle
accident was most probably caused by a rock or
other foreign object becoming lodged in the
pinch points associated with the exposed
proximity of the flexible coupling and the end
retainer nut, preventing the driver from
steering the vehicle.
5. Beginning in 1988, General Motors trucks
including Chevrolet pickup trucks, have been
redesigned wherein corrective action has been
taken to overcome the problem discussed in
paragraph four.
6. Specifically, General Motors has placed a
plastic shield over the exposed region of the
flexible coupling and the end retainer nut.
This plastic shield, by preventing foreign
8

objects from becoming lodged in the pinch
points, will help eliminate the defect which
existed on the Nay vehicle,
(See Affidavit of Ben Basye, Exhibit 0)
4. I have found that, prior to the date of
manufacture of the Nay truck, General Motors
has protected against such interference by
foreign objects by placing a plastic guard
over the steering coupling in its passenger
vehicles but not in its trucks.
5. I have also learned that General Motors
has, since the date of manufacture of the Nay
truck, placed a plastic guard over the
steering coupling in its trucks which protects
against interference by foreign objects, and
re-designed the steering gear end nut,
eliminating ears which, in my testing, proved
to be a major catch point on the gearbox end
when test rocks were inserted into the space
between the gearbox end and coupling.
(See Affidavit of David Stephens, Exhibit N)
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING A DIRECTED
VERDICT TO GENERAL MOTORS ON THE ISSUE OF
LIABILITY
A. THE STANDARD
OF REVIEW ONLY PERMITS THIS COURT TO EVALUATE
APPELLANTS1 EVIDENCE.
In their original brief, the appellants outlined the
evidence presented at trial which supported their claim of strict
liability against General Motors. (Brief of the Appellants, pp. 1223).

In

their

brief, General

Motors

uses

cross-examination

testimony from the appellants1 expert witness and direct testimony
from its own expert witnesses in an attempt to discredit the

appellants1

theory of how the accident occurred.

(Brief of

Appellee, pp. 15-28).
Under this Court's prior holdings, the use of such
testimony is improper.

In Koer v. Mayfair Mkts., 19 Utah 2d 3 39,

431 P.2d 566 (1967), this Court defined the scope of available
testimony when reviewing a directed verdict:
In disposing of a post verdict motion as well
as in directed verdicts, all of the testimony
and
all
reasonable
inferences
flowing
therefrom which tend to prove the plaintiff's
case must be accepted as true, and all
conflicts and all evidence which tends to
disprove it must be disregarded.
Koer, 19 Utah 2d, at 342, 431 P.2d at 569 (citations omitted).
Here, the appellants sought to establish General Motors'
liability

using

the testimony

qualified as experts.

of three witnesses

that were

If their testimony is credible, which must

be accepted for purposes of this appeal, there is little doubt that
the appellants stated a cause of action against General Motors in
strict liability.
General Motors' motive in presenting defense evidence to
this Court is clear.

General Motors hopes that this Court will

weigh the evidence and discredit the appellants' expert witness
testimony, ultimately holding that General Motors was entitled to
the

directed

verdict.

jurisprudence

weighing

However,
of

the
10

under

this

evidence

Court's

and

prior

credibility

determinations are not within this Court's function. Finlavson v.
Brady. 121 Utah 204, 240 P.2d 491 (1952).
However, the testimony presented in General Motors1 brief
does serve some purpose in this case.
that there are several

The testimony illustrates

issues of fact which could only be

determined by a jury. The appellants were denied their opportunity
for a jury determination when the trial court instructed the jury
to return a verdict with an insufficient number of concurring
jurors.1

B. THE JURY'S SPLIT WAS RELEVANT TO ESTABLISH THAT REASONABLE
JURORS COULD DISAGREE AS TO THE EVIDENCE.
General Motors argues that the jury's disagreement is
irrelevant to this appeal. (Brief of Appellee, p. 28) . However, the
jury's experience here is directly relevant to the standard of
review employed by this Court. Before the trial court could grant

1

An example from General Motors brief serves to illustrate
this point. One page 18 of its brief, General Motors asserts that
the appellants relied on "pictures of the accident scene which were
subject to various interpretations (exhibits 13, 29, 81, 90, 96102; Reide direct, 262-63, 270-74)." Assuming that General Motors
is correct and the pictures are subject to various interpretations,
could
the
trial
court
properly
resolve
those varying
interpretations in favor or General Motors, rather than allow the
jury to conclude what interpretation should be given to the
photographs?
This is but one of many factual disputes which
required a jury determination. In light of these many disputes, the
trial court should not have taken the case from the jury and
granted a directed verdict to General Motors.
11

a directed verdict to General Motors it had to conclude that no
reasonable juror could find for the appellants on the basis of the
evidence presented. Management Comm. v. Greystone Pines, 652 P.2d
896 (Utah 1986); Anderson v. Gribble. 30 Utah 2d 68, 513 P.2d 432
(1973); Rhiness v. Dansie. 24 Utah 2d 375, 472 P.2d 428 (1970).
The appellants1 argument is simply evidentiary.

Here,

the jurors did reach different conclusions as to the evidence
presented, which is indicative that the trial court too readily
concluded that the evidence would not permit a verdict for the
appellants.
C. STONE INTERFERENCE WAS THE PROBABLE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT
The bulk of General Motors' brief is spent asserting that
the stone interference theory is invalid and that "[n]o competent
mechanical engineer could espouse the theory plaintiffs were then
espousing, . . . " (Brief of Appellee, p. 19 n. 4). This argument
deserves a fuller treatment.
The appellants presented two accident reconstruction
expert witnesses, Lindley Manning and

Dr. Ben Basye.

Each

concluded not only could a stone become lodged between the flexible
coupling and the end retainer nut, but also that a stone did lodge
in the Nay vehicle's steering coupling, causing a total loss of
steering and a fatal crash. (T. Vol. I, p. 12, 1. 9-20; T. Vol. I,
p. 218, 1. 22-25).

Both these witnesses had been qualified as
12

experts in the field of mechanical engineering

and accident

reconstruction analysis, and Dr. Basye was a tenured professor at
the University of Missouri school of engineering.

General Motors

is free to discredit the testimony presented by these witnesses,
but in no manner is General Motors justified in concluding that
these witnesses are not competent2.
But Mr. Manning and Dr. Basye were not alone in their
conclusion that stone interference was possible and the cause of
the accident. The Value Engineering Laboratory conducted extensive
testing regarding stone interference in the steering coupling. The
final report from that study, "Valuation of the Steering of
Obstruction Problems Conducted for the Insurance Institute of
Highway Safety", was presented to the jury. (Trial Exhibit 6). The
study concluded that:

"[I]t was demonstrated that under some

driving conditions on gravel surfaces, gravel is kicked up into the
steering coupling."
lodged

The report includes photographs of stones

inside the steering coupling.

2

This report not only

General Motors accuses the appellants of relying upon
"purchased" testimony. (Brief of Appellee, p. 26) . This is an odd
accusation considering the witnesses presented by General Motors.
Gerald Confer testified at trial to having appeared on behalf of
General Motors in over 100 trials. (T. Vol. II, p. 228, 1. 5-11).
Pete Reide admitted to having testified at over 20 trials. (T.
Vol. II, p. 279, 1. 12-18). General Motors1 accusations regarding
"purchased" testimony can best be characterized as the "pot calling
the kettle black." Furthermore, whatever inferences General Motors
seeks to have this Court apply to the appellants' expert witnesses
must be applied equally to General Motors1 witnesses.
13

substantiates the appellants' theory as to the cause of the
accident, but also indicates that General Motors is wrong in its
conclusion that no competent mechanical engineer could espouse the
stone interference theory.
Despite this study produced after extensive testing,
General Motors continues to maintain that the appellants1 experts
are not competent. But one look at the evidence presented at trial
indicates that the only mechanical engineers which did not accept
the stone interference theory were those presented by General
Motors.
Furthermore, by arguing that stone

interference

is

impossible, General Motors ignores its own history of stone
interference. (General Motors was able to contend at trial that
stone

interference

was

impossible

statements were excluded.)

because

the

1973

recall

In 1973, General Motors recalled over

three million vehicles due to stone interference in the steering
coupling, the same defect at issue before this Court today.

In

both instances, a stone could become lodged between the flexible
coupling and a non-moving part, causing a loss of steering
capability. Despite recalling almost four million vehicles in 1973
for stone interference, General Motors is asserting that stone
interference is impossible.

Such inconsistencies run throughout

General Motors1 brief.
14

General Motors has taken corrective action to remedy the
stone interference problem. Beginning in 1988, General Motors began
to place shields over the flexible coupling and end retainer nut in
the steering column in order to eliminate the danger of stone
interference.

(See Affidavits of Ben Basye and David Stephens,

attached as Exhibits 0 and N, respectively.)

One cannot help but

ask: If there is no danger of a stone becoming lodged between the
flexible coupling and the end retainer nut, why place a shield over
this area in the steering column to avoid the non-existent danger?
(While this evidence was

excluded

at trial

as evidence of

subsequent remedial measures, General Motors should not be allowed
to discredit the appellants' expert witnesses for espousing a
theory which just two years after the accident General Motors
itself espoused.

In other words, General Motors should not be

entitled to hide behind the subsequent measures shield while at the
same time using the defense as a sword to attack the credibility of
witnesses for advancing a theory they themselves espouse.)
Also, General Motors has recently eliminated the "ears"
on the end retainer nut. (See Affidavit of David Stephens, Exhibit
N).

By

eliminating

these

ears,

interference is greatly reduced.

the

(Id.)

possibility

of

stone

This was one of the

measures the appellants' expert witness, Lindley Manning, testified
at trial could eliminate the problem. (T. Vol. I, p. 29, 1. 3-13).
15

Once again, while General Motors is claiming before this Court that
stone interference is impossible, it is taking action to eliminate
the "impossible" risk.
Finally, there is Lowe v. General Motors Corp., 624 F.2d
1373 (5th Cir. 1973). General Motors has asserted throughout this
litigation

that

it

was

impossible

for

the

right

set

of

circumstances to occur such that a stone could lodge between the
flexible coupling and the end retainer nut. (Brief of Appellee, p.
26-27). Furthermore, according to General Motors, even if a stone
could find its way to the steering coupling, the stone would break
or pop free before the steering was affected. (Id.)

However,

General Motors has attached an affidavit to their brief, signed by
their own attorney in the Lowe case, stating that a stone did lodge
in the steering coupling. (Brief of Appellee, Exhibit F). This
stone could not be dislodged by the force placed on the coupling by
the driver steering the vehicle, nor did the stone break or pop
free.
The inconsistencies in General Motors1
apparent.

argument are

First General Motors urges upon this Court that no

competent mechanical engineer could espouse the appellants1 stone
interference explanation of the accident.

In doing so, General

Motors ignores the testimony of the appellants1 competent expert
witnesses, the study conducted by the Value Engineering Laboratory,
16

its own experience with stone interference in 1973, and measures
introduced in 1988 to eliminate the danger.
Second, General Motors asserts that even if a stone found
its way to the steering coupling, it could not lodge in the
steering coupling. General Motors assures us that the stone would
either break or pop free.

But General Motors' attorney testifies

to this Court in a specially prepared affidavit that a stone did
become lodged in the pinch point between the flexible coupling and
the end retainer nut. The stone did not break. The stone did not
pop loose. Rather, the stone caused a total loss of steering and
a deadly crash.

Simply put, General Motors1 argument fails under

the weight of internal inconsistencies.
The appellants will conclude here as they did at trial.
General Motors has admitted that, on average, one million new
trucks are manufactured by General Motors each year. (T. Vol. II,
p. 289, 1. 5-12).

Each of these vehicles travels approximately

12,000 miles per year. (T. Vol. II, p. 289, 1. 17-20).

Thus, in

any one year, General Motors pickup trucks travel over twelve
billion miles.

Appellant's experts testified that it may be a

"chance in a million" that a stone would become lodged in the pinch
point between the flexible coupling and the end retainer nut.
However, if the possibility that a stone could become lodged inside
the steering coupling is one in a million, that possibility rises
17

to a near statistical certainty over time (at least a reasonable
probability) when considering the massive number of miles these
vehicles travel each year.

For example, 1 chance in 1,000,000 is

the same as 12,000 chances in 12,000,000,000.

In other words,

based on the average miles driven in these GM trucks every year, if
a stone interferes with the steering mechanism 1 time in every 1
million miles, it is a statistical certainty to occur 12,000 times
each year. At least four members of the jury concluded that if the
defect could be fixed, which it could by designing around it or
placing a plastic shield over it, that it should be fixed and thus
avoid entirely the risk that 12,000 times every year a stone will
become lodged in the steering mechanism and completely preclude a
driver's ability to steer his vehicle. What driver wants to expose
himself and his family to that kind of a risk which can cause
serious injury or death when the risk can be completely eliminated
altogether at a minimal cost.

When considering the evidence

presented by the appellants at trial, the trial court erred in
concluding that no reasonable juror could find for the appellants.
The appellants ask this Court to reverse the trial court's directed
verdict in favor of General Motors.
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XI
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN EXCLUDING EVIDENCE OF
GENERAL MOTORS' 1973 RECALL OF PASSENGER CARS
DESIGNED SUBSTANTIALLY SIMILAR TO THE NAY
VEHICLE,
A. THE NAY VEHICLE WAS DESIGNED SUBSTANTIALLY
RECALLED VEHICLES.

SIMILAR TO THE

The parties agree that before evidence
General

Motors1

recall

can be

admitted,

the

of the

1973

appellants

must

establish that the recalled vehicles and the Nay vehicle were
substantially similar in design3.

Hesson v. Jaguar Cars, 915 F.2d

641 (11th Cir. 1990); Calhoun v. Honda Motor Co. , 738 F.2d 126 (6th
Cir. 1984); Brief of Appellee, p. 30.

In order to establish the

similarity of the vehicles, the appellants provided testimony from
their own expert witness, Dr. Ben Basye, and from the defense
expert witness, Gerald Confer.

In their brief, General Motors

argues that these witnesses actually testified that the component
parts were similar, but the designs were not. (Brief of Appellee,
p. 33) .

However, a close reading of these witnesses testimony

3

General Motors argues that the evidence should be excluded
if the prejudice to General Motors outweighs the recall statements
relevancy.
However, General Motors does not argue before this
Court that admission of the recall statements would be prejudicial
to it, nor did General Motors argue prejudice before the trial
court. Therefore, the appellants do not argue the point, with the
minor exception of citing Barry v. Manqlass, 389 N.Y.S.2d 870
(1976), wherein the court held that the relevancy of recall
statements will seldom be outweighed by prejudice.
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indicates that both witnesses considered the design of the Nay
vehicle to be similar to the design of the recalled vehicles.
Dr. Ben Basye testified through affidavit4 as follows:
4. The Saginaw steering system used in
the 1986 GMC High Sierra pickup truck driven
by Wayne Nay (Hereinafter the "Nay" vehicle)
was mechanically and functionally essentially
equivalent to the steering system used in the
3,707,064 General Motors automobiles which
were recalled in 1973 (NHTSA Recall Campaign
No. 73-0013).
5. There existed pinch points on the Nay
vehicle's steering system that constituted the
same potential hazard which led to the recall
of the 3,707,064 General Motors cars in 1973.
6. It is my opinion that the Nay vehicle
accident was most probably caused by a rock or
other foreign object becoming lodged in the
pinch points associated with the exposed
proximity of the flexible coupling and the end
retainer nut, preventing the driver from
steering the vehicle.
7. The steering parts on the NHTSA Recall
(No. 73-0013) cars and the Nay's GMC vehicle
are functionally equivalent, resulting in the
same potential hazard; namely a pinch point
between a part that must rotate and a fixed
part preventing the driver from steering the
vehicle.
(Affidavit of C. Ben Basye, attached as Exhibit Q).

Dr. Basye is

testifying that the designs are similar to the extent that the same
hazard exists in both designs—the
4

location of the flexible

This affidavit was included as an exhibit in the appellants'
memorandum in opposition to General Motors' Motion in Limine. The
affidavit is therefore already included in the record below.
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coupling in close proximity to a non-movable part, allowing for a
stone to become lodged in the coupling, causing a loss of steering.
The deposition testimony of General Motors1 own expert
witness, Gerald Confer, is more revealing.

Mr. Confer was being

asked by appellants1 counsel whether he had conducted tests to
determine if stone interference was possible:
Q. So you have done it on several
occasions?
A. I have done it wherever we are under
the circumstances, and I demonstrated it
in many, many instances, but the
instances I'm referring to would be with
the B car which was the subject of the
recall.
Q. And if I understand you correctly, you haven't
actually got down and done that demonstration in
regards to any trucks; is that correct?
A. No.
Q. But you are relying upon your experience with
the B. cars?
A. Well, if you want to relate now to the steering
gear or the coupling, there's no difference between
the B car and the truck, they're the same.
(Deposition of Gerald Confer, p. 67-68).

Mr. Confer indicates in

this testimony that there is no need for him to conduct independent
testing for stone interference on General Motors' trucks because
the trucks are similar in design to the B cars recalled in 1973.
Thus, the expert witnesses for both parties agree that the design
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of the Nay truck is substantially similar to the design of the
vehicles recalled in 1973.
The crux of General Motors1 argument seems to be that the
1973 recall involved stones lodged between the coupling and the
frame. Having moved the frame, the defect is solved for now and all
eternity. However, the appellants are arguing that the location of
the flexible coupling in close proximity to a non-moving part
constitutes a defect, whether the non-moving part is the frame or
the end retainer nut.
The recall notices are relevant evidence that General
Motors was aware that a hazard was created when the flexible
coupling was placed in close proximity to a non-moving part.
1973, the non-moving part was the frame.

In

On the Nay vehicle, a

1986 GMC pickup, the non-moving part was the end retainer nut. The
recall notices are evidence that General Motors repeated the
ultrahazardous design for which it should have learned its lesson
in 1973.
B. LOWE V. GENERAL MOTORS IS RELEVANT TO THIS APPEAL
General Motors misunderstands the appellants1 use of the
Fifth Circuit decision in Lowe v. General Motors, 624 F.2d 1373
(5th Cir. 1980) .

Indeed, General Motors goes so far as to

introduce an affidavit to the effect that the Lowe case involved
aspects not present in this appeal. (Brief of Appellee, Exhibit F) .
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Through Lowe, the appellants sought to establish two
principles: 1) that the 1973 recall statements are relevant as to
whether the design of the Nay vehicle was defective; and 2) that
exclusion

of

appellants.

the

recall

statements

was

prejudicial

to

the

Lowe establishes both of these propositions, while

also establishing that there is no private cause of action under
the Motor Vehicle Safety Act.
The 1973 recall advised owners that a stone might become
lodged between the flexible coupling and the frame.

In Lowe, the

plaintiffs alleged that a stone became lodged inside the coupling,
between the flexible coupling and the end retainer nut.

(General

Motors asserts that the case differs because the non-moving part
was the frame. This is irrelevant because the stone, if the frame
was absent, could eventually have lodged against the end retainer
nut as the driver turned the wheel.

In either case, the lodging

could cause a total loss of steering.)

The Fifth Circuit held:

The risk of partial loss of steering due to a
stone lodged between the coupling and the
frame and the risk of a total loss of steering
due to a stone lodged within the steering
coupling are quite similar dangers. It is not
unreasonable to infer that if GM knew of one
risk, they might have known of the other.
Lowe, 624 F.2d at 1382.
The appellants seek introduction of the recall statements
for the same purpose—to establish that a stone lodged within the
23

steering coupling is a danger to be guarded against with the same
fervor as a stone lodged between the coupling and the frame. The
jury here should have been allowed to evaluate the dangers involved
in the recall just as the jury in Lowe was permitted to hear
evidence of the recall.
Lowe is also relevant regarding the prejudice incurred by
the appellants when the trial court excluded the notices. In Lowe,
the plaintiffs were allowed to introduce recall evidence and
recovered $500,000 for the passenger's estate and $500,000 for the
driver's estate.

Barred from using the recall evidence in the

second trial, the plaintiffs were non-suited. Here, the appellants
were barred from using the recall evidence, and were non-suited.
With the recall statements, the appellants may recover.
Lowe demonstrates the powerful effect recall statements
can have on the plaintiff's ability to meet their burden of proof.
Here, as in Lowe, the plaintiffs were non-suited when deprived of
the recall statements. Clearly, the exclusion of recall statements
prejudiced the appellants in the case before the Court.
Thus, while Lowe does discuss the nature of a private
cause of action under the Motor Vehicle Safety Act, the decision
also reaches issues relevant to this appeal, and therefore remains
persuasive authority with this Court.
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C. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
General

Motors

does

not

dispute

the

many

policy

considerations supporting admission of the recall statements set
forth in the appellants' brief.5
CONCLUSION
The appellants

ask this Court to reverse the trial

court's directed verdict and order a new trial.

The appellants

further ask this Court to rule that the 1973 recall statements be
admitted during the second trial.
DATED this

3 £> day of September, 1991.
MORGAN & HANSEN
Stephen G. Morgan

H

*
Rather, General Motors asserts that the recall
statements should be excluded as evidence of subsequent remedial
measures. (Brief of Appellee, p. 30, n. 5) . While on its face this
argument may have some appeal, the vast majority of courts have
ruled that recall notices should be admitted despite there nature
as subsequent repair evidence. Farner v. Paccar. 562 F.2d 518 (8th
Cir. 1977); Carey v. General Motors Corp., 387 N.E.2d 583 (Mass.
1979); Millette v. Radosta. 404 N.E.2d 823 (111. App. 1980). These
courts have ruled that the doctrine of subsequent repairs is
inapplicable because the Motor Vehicle Safety Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §
1411, is mandatory in requiring disclosure of motor vehicle defects
through a recall. See Rinker v. Ford Motor Co. . 567 S.W.2d 655,
665 (Mo.App.1988).
While the threat of possible litigation may provide an
incentive for some manufacturers to avoid initiating recall
campaigns, the stiff penalties provided under the Motor Vehicle
Safety Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1398, up to $800,000 per violation,
provide ample incentive for full disclosure to the vehicle owners
of all defects. Having provided a incentive for the manufacturer
to comply with the statute, there is no reason to exclude recall
evidence under the doctrine of subsequent repairs.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the ^

day of September, 1991,

I caused a true and correct copy of APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF to be
hand delivered to H. James Clegg, SNOW CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU,
Attorney for Defendants/Respondents, 10 Exchange Place, Eleventh
Floor. P.O. Box 45000, Salt Lake City, Utah 84145.
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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
LEEANN NAY, individually and as
personal representative for
MATTHEW and MERISSA NAY, the
heirs of ROBERT NAY; and
VIRGINIA NAY, individually
and as personal representative
for CONNIE WHEELER, CAROLYN
GALLEGHER, JOAN NAY and
JALYNN NAY, the heirs of
WAYNE NAY,

:
:
:
:

Appeal No. 910244

Plaintiffs/Appellants,
vs.
GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, GMC
TRUCK DIVISION AND RON GREEN
CHEVROLET PONTIAC GMC, INC.,

:

Defendants/Respondents.
AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID STEPHENS
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
: ss.
)

David Stephens being first duly sworn, deposes and says:
1.
and

I am a qualified expert in accident reconstruction

failure analysis

in the state of Utah, Idaho, Wyoming,

California, Montana and Tennessee•
2.

On September 27, 1986, I examined the accident

location at which, on September 20, 1986, Wayne Nay was in a truck
accident, and, on September 29, 1986, I interviewed Matthew Nay, a

passenger in the truck who was sitting next to Wayne Nay.

The

information which I gathered at the accident location and learned
from Matthew Nay convinced me that the front wheels remained in a
straight ahead mode (did not turn left) as the vehicle traveled
from the road to the edge of the embankment.
3.

I was the first person to disassemble the steering

gear from the Nay truck.

At that time, I was not aware of the

possibility of a rock or other foreign object getting in the area
of the steering coupling and frame or gearbox end nut and cause
steering limiting interference. I therefore did not look for marks
which might have been left by such interference.

By the time that

I had become aware of the interference possibility, the steering
coupling and end nut had been disposed of and were no longer
available for examination.
4.

I have found that, prior to the date of manufacture

of the Nay truck, General Motors has protected against such
interference by foreign objects by placing a plastic guard over the
steering coupling in its passenger vehicles but not in its trucks.
5.

I have also learned that General Motors has, since

the date of manufacture of the Nay truck, placed a plastic guard
over the steering coupling in its trucks which protects against
interference by foreign objects, and re-designed the steering gear
end nut, eliminating ears which, in my testing, proved to be a

major catch point on the gearbox end when test rocks were inserted
into the space between the gearbox end and coupling.
6.

The foregoing facts are within my personal knowledge

and if asked as a witness, I could and would testify to the same.
DATED this

">/

day of September, 1991.

<£^>f*•v?
David Stephens
In the County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, on this
day of September, 1991, before me, the undersigned notary,
personally appeared David Stephens who is personally know to me to
be the person whose name is signed on the preceding document in my
presence and who swore or affirmed to me that the signature is
voluntary and the document truthful.

My/Golftmissdbon Expires:
;s >\
v

- " —

Notary Public
Residing in

>*

' Sit

\3

<^

County
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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
LEEANN NAY, individually and as
personal representative for
MATTHEW and MERISSA NAY, the
heirs of ROBERT NAY; and
VIRGINIA NAY, individually
and as personal representative
for CONNIE WHEELER, CAROLYN
GALLEGHER, JOAN NAY and
JALYNN NAY, the heirs of
WAYNE NAY,

:
:
:
:

Appeal No. 910244

Plaintiffs/Appellants,
VS.

GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, GMC
TRUCK DIVISION AND RON GREEN
CHEVROLET PONTIAC GMC, INC.,

:

Defendants/Respondents.
AFFIDAVIT OF C. BEN BASYE
STATE OF MISSOURI
COUNTY OF HOWARD

)
: ss.
)

C. Ben Basye being first duly sworn, deposes and says:
1.

I am over 21 years of age and am a resident of

Howard County, State of Missouri.
2.

I am currently a Professor of Engineering Mechanics,

University of Missouri-Rolla Graduate Engineering Center of St.
Louis.

I have received a Phd. in Engineering Mechanics from Iowa

State University; my

minors were Mechanical

Mathematics from the same institution.

Engineering

and

3.

To exert 200 foot-pounds of torque on a steering

wheel, 14 inches in diameter, which is similar to the Nay vehicle,
one would have to push up with 171 pounds with one hand and down
with 171 pounds with the other hand in the opposite direction.
(171 pounds) times (14/12 feet) = 200 foot-pounds
It is false to state that the average male can do thisl
4.

It is my opinion that the Nay vehicle accident was

most probably caused by a rock or other foreign object becoming
lodged in the pinch points associated with the exposed proximity of
the flexible coupling and the end retainer nut, preventing the
driver from steering the vehicle.
5.

Beginning in 1988, General Motors trucks including

Chevrolet pickup trucks, have been redesigned wherein corrective
action has been taken to overcome the problem discussed

in

paragraph four.
6.

Specifically, General Motors has placed a plastic

shield over the exposed region of the flexible coupling and the end
retainer nut.

This plastic shield, by preventing foreign objects

from becoming lodged in the pinch points, will help eliminate the
defect which existed on the Nay vehicle.
7.

The foregoing facts are within my personal knowledge

and if asked as a witness, I could and would testify to the same.
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DATED this Zt},fvday of September, 1991.

In the County of Howard, State of Missouri, dii this £D
day of September, 1991, before me, the undersigned notary,
personally appeared C. Ben Basye who is personally know to me to be
the person whose name is signed on the preceding document in my
presence and who swore or affirmed to me that the signature is
voluntary and the document truthful.

My Commission Expires:

Notary^u&Iic
Residing in

3
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Stephen G. Morgan, No. 2315
John Edward Hansen, No. 4590
MORGAN & HANSEN
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
Kearns Building, Eighth Floor
13 6 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 531-7888
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

LEEANN NAY, individually and as
personal representative for
MATTHEW and MARISSAN NAY, the
heirs of ROBERT NAY; and
VIRGINIA NAY, individually and
as personal representative for
CONNIE WHEELER, CAROLYN GALLEGHER,
JOAN NAY and JALYNN NAY, the heirs
of WAYNE NAY,

AFFIDAVIT OF C. BEN
BASYE

Plaintiffs,
vs.

Civil No. C 88-6114

GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, GMC
TRUCK DIVISION AND RON GREEN
CHEVROLET PONTIAC GMC, INC.
Defendants.
C. Ben Basye, Ph.D., P.E., upon being duly sworn, deposes
and says:
1.

I am over 21 years of age and am a resident of Howard

County, State of Missouri.
2.

I am currently a Professor of Engineering Mechanics,

University of Missouri-Rolla Graduate Engineering Center of St.

Louis and a consulting engineer.
3.

I have received a Ph.D. in Engineering Mechanics from

Iowa State University; my minors were Mechanical Engineering and
Mathematics from the same institution.
4.

The Saginaw steering system used in the 1986 GMC High

Sierra pickup truck driven by Wayne Nay (hereinafter the "Nay"
vehicle)

was

mechanically

and

functionally

essentially

equivalent to the steering system used in the 3,707,064 General
Motors automobiles which were recalled in 1973

(NHTSA Recall

Campaign No. 73-0013).
5.

There

existed

pinch

points

on

the

Nay

vehicle's

steering system that constituted the same potential hazard which
led to the recall of the 3,707,064 General Motors cars in 1973.
6.

It is my opinion that the Nay vehicle accident was most

probably caused by a rock or other foreign object becoming lodged
in the pinch points associated with the exposed proximity of the
flexible coupling and the end retainer nut, preventing the driver
from steering the vehicle.
7.

The steering parts on the NHTSA Recall (No. 73-0013)

cars and the Nay's GMC vehicle are functionally equivalent,
resulting in the same potential hazard; namely a pinch point
between a part that must rotate and a fixed part preventing the
driver from steering the vehicle.
8.

I am familiar with the design and potential defects of

the 1973 recall campaign vehicles.
9.

In my opinion, the critical safety issue involved in

the 1973 recall campaign is the existence of pinch points coupled
with the possibility that foreign objects can be thrown into the
area of the pinch points•
10.

It is my professional opinion that the method regarding

how the foreign objects come into contact with the pinch points—
whether the front cross member or the front tires throws the
foreign objects

into the pinch points—is

only of secondary

importance.
11.

Based

on

my

experience

as

an

engineer, it

is my

opinion that due to the design defect and resulting problems
relative to the 1973 recall campaign vehicles, General Motors
knew, or should have known, that the Nay truck suffered a similar
design defect which allowed foreign objects to become lodged in
the flexible coupling and thereby interfered with the steering
capability of the vehicle.
12.

Because of the problems which led to the 1973 recall

campaign, which resulted in the placing of a plastic shield over
the flexible coupling on those vehicles, I believe that General
Motors knew, or should have known, that a similar Problem could
occur in trucks such as the Nay vehicle, and General Motors
should have placed a plastic shield, or taken other corrective
action, on those vehicles as well.

13.
with the

In support for the above, I would note that beginning
1988 models and subsequent thereto, General Motors

trucks including Chevrolet pick-up trucks have been redesigned
wherein

corrective

action

has

been

taken

to

overcome

the

potential problem discussed above.
14.

The foregoing facts are within my personal knowledge

and if called as a witness, I could and would testify to the
same.
DATED t h i s

31

day of

ftu;0Lsf

1990.

c"! rien -Bayaa- "&ojSf

j&u

In the County of Howard, State of Missouri, on this 3}
day of
facuuij^l—
, 1990, before me, the undersigned notary,
personally appeared C. Ben Bayse who is personally known to me to
be the person whose name is signed on the preceding document in
my presence and who swore or affirmed to me that the signature is
voluntary and the document truthful.

C

3J^^

Notary-S i g n a t u r e a/
E x p i r a t i o n Date
fjL^jif-*?{)

